·        Ignores 9/11 Commission recommendations.  The 9/11 Commission was concerned about civil liberties.  The 9/11 Commission wrote that the burden of proof is on the executive branch of government to show that the power it exercises "materially enhances security" and protects civil liberties.  The Department's policy does not meet these criteria.

·        Contractors are already legally responsible for employees’ work-related behavior.  The government has made contracts for hundreds of years.  The government has no more need to screen all contractor employees than an individual does to demand personal information from the employee of every company with which he or she does business.

·        No clue how data will be used.  There is no explanation of how data gathered about contractor employees will be reviewed or used.  Suppose some contractor employee is late paying bills.  How will ED decide whether such an employee is “cleared” or not?  In general, what is the relationship between someone’s credit history and their qualifications to do good work for a contractor?

·        No rationale provided.  There is no identified “problem” for which a security clearance or background check for so many contractor employees is the “solution.”

·        Costs.  Even if there were a “problem,” there has been no analysis to show that the security clearance policy is a good solution.  Other alternatives may be cheaper, faster, or better.  The office of the Inspector General at ED estimated a cost of $3 million just for ED’s portion of costs in one year.  In addition, contractor employees themselves, and any people ED contacts during the background check (such as doctors), also bear costs above and beyond ED’s expenditures.  It is unlikely that the policy will result in millions of dollars of benefits, when applied to so many contractor  employees without distinction.

·        Privacy.  ED’s policy erodes individuals’ privacy without a clear, compelling reason.  Will ED share personal information with other federal agencies?  Who within ED will see it?

·        Potential loss of private, sensitive data.  The federal government has carelessly lost confidential information for millions of veterans, as well as for other federal employees.  How will sensitive information be safeguarded?

·        Undermines trust in ED and intimidates people.  The policy alienates many contractors and their employees, who cannot understand why the policy is needed.  The policy demonstrates distrust of contractors, who are legally responsible for the quality of their work and for the quality and actions of their employees.  Many contractors and individuals believe that if they object they will be in trouble, so many don’t object.  ED is putting people in a terrible position, saying, “do this or don’t get paid.”  Gathering sensitive information about so many people, for so little purpose, suggests there may be a malicious motive at work; for example, under the Nixon administration, the White House had an “enemies list” used to harass individuals out of favor (e.g., via IRS audits).

·        Sets a poor precedent for contractors.  A healthy relationship between ED and a contractor may require the contractor to provide professional opinions that ED does not want to hear.  If contractors do not speak up for what they believe is right, an important element of the contract relationship is lost.  People need to believe that more than expediency or profit governs contractors’ behavior.  Contractors who “go along” with this policy although they believe it is wrong at least need to ask questions or they may lose their reputation for independence and objectivity.

·        “Nonsense.”  A former Republican ED Assistant Secretary, Diane Ravitch, wrote that “resisting nonsense is one of the habits that citizens need to hone in a free society.”  This policy provides an excellent example of nonsense, as anyone who has tried to understand the Department’s poorly written policy directive can testify.

·        Ineffective.  If “vetting” someone by doing a simple background check could establish that they were trustworthy, a former domestic policy advisor to President Bush, Claude Allen (who presumably was vetted thoroughly), would not have been subsequently arrested for and pleaded guilty to theft.  ED’s requirements are likely to cost a lot and accomplish little or no good.